Neoliberalism in Japan’s tuna fisheries? Government intervention and reform in the distant water longline industry by Barclay, Kate & Sun-Hui, Koh
 
 
 
N 
05–2 
 
 International and Development Economics  
 
 
Asia Pacific School  
of Economics and Government 
 
WORKING PAPERS 
     
 
 AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY 
 
  
eoliberalism in Japan’s 
Tuna Fisheries? 
Government intervention and reform 
in the Distant Water Longline Industry
Kate Barclay, 
Sun-Hui Koh 
Asia Pacific School  of  Economics and Government 
THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY 
 
http://apseg.anu.edu.au 
 
 
 
 
©Kate Barclay, Sun-Hui Koh 2005 
 
Kate Barclay (Kate.Barclay@anu.edu.au), Postdoctoral Fellow, Asia Pacific School 
of Economics and Government, JG Crawford Building (13), Australian National 
University. 
 
Sun-Hui Koh, (koh@fish.kagoshima-u.ac.jp), Associate Professor in Sociology, 
Marine Social Science Department, Faculty of Fisheries Kagoshima University. 
 
Abstract 
Neoliberalism is a political economy term that refers to a public policy mix that is 
market oriented, pro trade liberalization and advocates minimal state intervention in 
the economy. Japanese governance has arguably not been based on neoliberal 
principles, and some see this as contributing to Japan’s long running recession. 
Japan’s distant water tuna longline fleet has been in economic difficulties since the 
early years of the recession. In 2001 Prime Minister Koizumi came to power 
promising neoliberal style reform. This paper presents a history of government 
involvement in the distant water tuna longline industry and looks for evidence that 
recent reforms have changed this involvement; both in terms of observable changes to 
governance structures, and of key stakeholders’ receptiveness to neoliberalism as 
visible in their representations of issues facing tuna fisheries. We find that very few 
neoliberal reforms have been implemented in this sector. Furthermore key 
stakeholders show little sympathy with neoliberal policy prescriptions, meaning they 
are unlikely to champion such reforms. This conclusion may be specific to fisheries 
since in Japan the political importance of food production and the iconic status of fish 
cuisine make the sector particularly susceptible to economic nationalism. In 
examining relations between industry and government the paper also highlights 
problems in Japan’s co-management of fisheries. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The 1970s combination of economic stagnation with inflation discredited the Keynesian 
principles that had informed post World War II governance in wealthy capitalist 
economies. At the same time, economic failures in many of the worlds’ developing 
countries discredited neomarxist principles of protectionism and state sponsored 
industrialization. In countries such as the United States, Britain, Australia and New 
Zealand, as well as in international donor agencies such as the World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund, there was a swing against Keynesian and neomarxist faith in 
state intervention in economies, and a corresponding swing towards faith in markets and 
free trade, based on neoclassical economic theories. The public policy school of thought 
that emerged from this swing – pro-privatization, pro-trade liberalization, pro-globalization, 
pro-markets, pro-small government, anti-protection, anti-trade union, anti-welfare, and anti-
state planned economy – has been called neoliberalism.4  
                                                 
1 Postdoctoral Fellow, Asia Pacific School of Economics and Government, JG Crawford Building (13), 
Australian National University, Canberra ACT 0200, AUSTRALIA, Tel: +61 407 407 905 (mobile), Fax: +61 
2 6125 8448, Kate.Barclay@anu.edu.au
2 Asian names in this paper follow the convention of family name first, personal name second. 
3 Associate Professor in Sociology, Marine Social Science Department, Faculty of Fisheries 
Kagoshima University, Shimo Arata 4-50-20, Kagoshima City 890-0056, JAPAN, Tel: +81 90 9483 1828 
(mobile), Fax: +81 99 286 4297, koh@fish.kagoshima-u.ac.jp
4 ‘Neoliberalism’ is an imperfect term for many reasons, including the fact that rather than being a new form 
of liberalism it mixes strands of liberalism with strands of conservatism. Furthermore, people who espouse 
neoliberal tenets do not usually apply the term to themselves, indeed it is often used (pejoratively) by 
opponents of neoliberalism. But in the absence of another umbrella term with which to refer to this style of 
capitalist governance, ‘neoliberalism’ must suffice. 
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Concurrent with the fall of faith in state intervention and the rise of neoliberalism, Japan 
demonstrated miraculous economic recovery after the devastation of World War II. The 
economic success of Japan and other East Asian economies were interpreted by some as 
evidence supporting neoliberalism [1,2,3]. Empirical evidence, however, indicates that 
Japan’s capitalism has been distinguished by extensive government intervention. Before the 
bubble burst in the early 1990s some posited Japan’s interventionism in opposition to the 
neoliberal model, claiming Japan was a ‘capitalist developmental state’ that showed 
government intervention could be economically successful [4]. Since the recession more 
research has focused on the dysfunctional nature of Japanese government intervention in 
the economy, arguing that it stymies economic recovery [5,6,7]. 
 
Since the onset of recession sporadic attempts to reform the economy have been made by 
successive Prime Ministers, but far reaching reform seemed most likely to be implemented 
with the election of Koizumi Junichirô in 2001. Koizumi’s platform included ‘a raft of 
changes designed to drive the economy in a more market-liberal direction’, and he has 
suggested his plans constitute an attempt to introduce neoliberalism to Japan [5 pp.3-4]  
 
This paper assesses the extent to which neoliberal reforms have affected the distant water 
tuna longline industry. First, a general overview of government intervention in the Japanese 
economy sets the groundwork for discussion. Second, a history of Japanese fisheries 
governance shows the nature and extent of government intervention in this sector. Then 
three major areas of government support for fisheries are examined to see whether 
neoliberal reforms have changed governance of the distant water tuna longline industry in 
recent years. Following that the normative framework of fisheries governance is examined, 
to gauge the political feasibility of neoliberal reform attempts. This involves analysis of 
representations by stakeholder groups, including consumer representatives, industry bodies 
and fisheries bureaucrats. Findings suggest that the Japanese tuna industry has not yet been 
significantly liberalized and is unlikely to be in the foreseeable future. There are vested 
interests against neoliberal reform by stakeholders with the structural capacity to block 
reform, and prevailing public policy philosophy amongst stakeholders does not constitute 
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pressure to liberalize this sector. Indeed, there is more pressure for protection of tuna 
fisheries, based on arguments about cultural heritage and food security. 
 
2. GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN THE FISHERIES INDUSTRY 
2.1. Overview of Japanese Government Intervention in the Economy 
The bureaucracy wields a great deal of power in Japan. Bureaucrats have a very significant 
role in developing policy, and the bureaucracy is relatively autonomous from Prime 
Minister and Cabinet [5]. Furthermore, the bureaucracy usually directs government 
intervention in the economy [7]. The main procedure by which the bureaucracy intervenes 
is ‘administrative guidance’ (gyôsei shidô). This procedure has been well documented; 
ministry officials are ‘entrusted with much discretion in filling in the detail of broad and 
vaguely worded laws with ministerial regulations and administrative notices’ [8 p. 56]. 
Administrative guidance takes place within, and gains much of its efficacy from, a thick 
layer of affiliated organizations (gaikaku dantai) that sit between the ministries and the 
industries they govern.  
 
The gaikaku dantai includes thousands of bodies such as special corporations (tokushû 
hôjin), public corporations (kôeki hôjin) and chartered corporations (ninka hôjin), that are 
managed and subsidized by the national government [7]. These corporations service 
industries under the portfolio of the ministry that sponsors them. For example, many are 
financial services institutions or public works corporations. There are also a range of 
associations (shadan) and foundations (zaidan) similarly managed and subsidized by 
ministries for the benefit of sectors under their portfolio. Although industry associations 
might be assumed to be civil society organizations, in Japan most were established by 
government and remain structurally closely affiliated to government [9].  
 
The two main mechanisms by which influence and money flow between the bureaucracy 
and business are: 1) ministries’ discretion to allocate public money for public works and for 
a wide range of industry support programs; and 2) practices of shukkô - seconding mid-
career officials for a few years to management positions in gaikaku dantai - and amakudari 
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- senior bureaucrats taking up positions in the private sector upon retirement.5 Together 
these mechanisms form a system of incentives that facilitate the execution of ministry 
directives in the private sector and/or in organizations that directly service the private 
sector.  
 
Vast amounts of public money is spent on the private sector through the gaikaku dantai, in 
the form of public works or various kinds of subsidy, at the discretion of the ministries that 
manage them. The gaikaku dantai therefore extend ministries’ power and prestige in the 
sector in question. The ministries thus have corporate interests in preserving this system. 
The practice of amakudari provides financial and status incentives for individual senior 
bureaucrats to protect the status quo. The private sector also has vested interests in 
supporting this system. Gaikaku dantai industry associations exert pressure against industry 
members challenging the gaikaku dantai system, since the industry associations are 
subsidized by government and many of the leadership posts in gaikaku dantai are held by 
ex-ministry officials. Businesses fear retribution from ministries through ministries’ 
regulatory powers (for example, withholding of licenses), and also fear ostracism from the 
industry association (for example, boycotting by other members of the industrial group) [7]. 
The private sector is thus inhibited from pushing for reform of the gaikaku dantai system. 
 
In sum, Japanese government intervention in the economy is characterized by a very 
powerful bureaucracy which has an established role directing the private sector through 
administrative guidance, and which is tied closely to industry by flows of managers and 
public funds through the gaikaku dantai. This institutional system emerged out of political 
economy developments in Japan over the twentieth century. The following section of the 
paper details how these general governance features have been manifest in tuna fisheries.  
 
2.2 History of Japan’s Distant Water Longline Tuna Fisheries 
Japan’s modern industrial fishing industries started during the Meiji era (1868-1912). The 
Meiji government was remarkably successful in its aim of matching European powers of 
                                                 
5 When senior officials retire they are banned from taking positions in the private sector proper for two years, 
but they are allowed to take up positions in gaikaku dantai corporations/organizations, which gives them a 
continued income until they can move on to the private sector proper, or they may stay in the gaikaku dantai. 
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the time by modernizing, building military strength, and building a colonial empire. 
Overseas fishing activities were part of the empire building exercise [10,11], and also part 
of the improvement and expansion of food production and distribution necessary for an 
urbanizing industrializing economy, especially since parts of Japan were susceptible to 
famine [12]. Because offshore fishing was playing these important roles it was supported 
by the Meiji government. The Fisheries Promotion Act of 1897 was the framework for this 
support, which included initiatives such as the Fisheries Training Institute (opened 1889, 
now the Tokyo University of Marine Science and Technology), as well as financial support 
for technological developments in ship-building, such as installing engines (1903), 
refrigeration equipment (1907) and radios (1918) [12].  
 
The gaikaku dantai played a key role in facilitating governance and guiding modernization 
from the outset. In 1882 the Meiji government established the Dai Nippon Suisankai (Great 
Japan Fisheries Association) [13].The Dai Nippon Suisankai was established by bureaucrat 
Shinagawa Yajirō, who also set up several similar associations for other sectors under the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce. The first president of the Dai Nippon Suisankai 
was not a fisherman, but a representative of the state (Prince Komatsunomiya Akihito). 
Local fisheries associations were another part of the fisheries gaikaku dantai. In 1901 the 
Fisheries Law transferred fishing rights from the corporate property of fishing villages to 
local fisheries associations set up all over the country (Gyogyô Kumiai, which later became 
the Gyogyô Kyodô Kumiai, usually called Gyokyô or Fisheries Cooperative Associations), 
These fisheries associations took on the regulation of fishing licenses [13,14]. Agricultural 
and industrial societies established in the first half of the twentieth century were legally 
empowered to engage in a range of activities including marketing and distribution [9]. 
Some fishing associations diversified into the marketing of seafood products and by the 
1920s had largely taken over the role merchants had played in the Tokugawa and Meiji eras 
[14 p.139]. In addition, industry associations became involved in policy making processes, 
not just through lobbying, but also more direct involvement in governance, such as setting 
prices and executing policies in the relevant sector [9 p.42]. The distribution and regulatory 
functions of the industry associations were strengthened with the military build-up and 
during World War II. Early public corporations that supported fisheries endeavors include 
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the Ishigaki Industry Promotion Foundation (now called the Agriculture Forestry Fisheries 
Promotion Foundation – Nôrinsuisan Shôrei Kai) established in 1926 [13]. 
 
Japan’s fisheries were decimated at the end of World War II [15 p.13] (see Table 1). In the 
immediate postwar years there was famine, so in order to boost food production the Allied 
occupying forces and the Japanese government again supported tuna fishers to rebuild 
fleets and port infrastructure. The colonial empire had provided a large proportion of 
Japan’s food supply, so in the immediate postwar years Japan had not only to recover 
domestic food production but also to replace colonial production. Offshore fisheries played 
a major role in this [16 p.177]. The government promoted Japanese fishers moving out into 
the world again after restrictions on their travels by the Allied occupying force were lifted 
in 1952, in a policy with the slogan ‘from coastal to offshore, from offshore to distant 
waters’ [15 p.13, 12 p.58]. Postwar distant water fishing was no longer part of a military 
expansion, but it retained a sense of being a Japanese political presence overseas. The 
postwar political role of distant water fisheries has been mainly through economic ties and 
aid diplomacy [17].  
 
The Japanese economic recovery was consolidated in the 1960s. Fisheries production as a 
whole increased dramatically during the 1960s, and tuna production was no exception (see 
Table 1). Up until 1950 tuna (other than skipjack) production had remained under 10,000 
tonnes, then by 1960 was over 50,000 tonnes and from then on mostly stayed over 40,000 
tonnes into the 1990s [12]. Quantity ceased to be a pressing national food security issue and 
consumers started to demand high quality high value products. At the same time 
developments in ultra-low freezing technology enabled Japanese distant water longline 
fishers to supply sashimi tuna in commercially significant amounts.  
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Table 1. Kagoshima Prefecture Fisheries Production 1936-1965 (metric tons) 
 
 Tuna6 Sardines Skipjack Shark Mackerel7 Total 
1936 5,012 23,944 9,542 1,231 6,762 60,498 
1937 6,969 27,491 11,071 1,321 5,914 67,769 
1938 6,311 22,997 12,005 1,495 4,931 62,447 
1939 10,044 28,082 9,118 1,611 4,292 66,153 
1940 3,810 24,597 312 73 7,117 57,080 
1941 5,024 34,832 7,186 1,049 4,729 81,990 
1942 2,092 21,256 8,555 1,214 6,435 59,488 
1943/48 2,176 13,998 6,273 3,568 3,082 44,892 
1945 118 3,664 322 223 1,675 13,268 
1946 431 4,830 2,099 348 1,749 16,289 
1947 764 13,355 3,047 552 2,933 27,974 
1948 1,403 8,091 2,712 973 3,391 25,295 
1949 2,941 18,745 6,365 1,788 8,045 47,265 
1950 2,751 21,842 12,002 1,373 4,008 54,984 
1951 4,747 17,526 10,895 1,992 7,625 57,260 
1952 4,424 11,276 13,868 2,567 14,947 60,504 
1953 5,285 16,884 14,169 2,830 14,262 69,128 
1954 3,983 7,839 15,735 2,183 16,640 61,901 
1955 3,860 14,488 18724 1,889 25,833 78,146 
1956 4,252 9,106 15,870 1,646 17,211 63,019 
1957 4,758 11,000 18,718 2,604 45.543 97,374 
1958 5,375 8,995 23,175 1,888 40,485 95,487 
1959 5,980 10,123 24,511 1,453 27,837 86,746 
1960 5,755 11,989 17,856 2,213 33,840 87,815 
1961 6,777 6,566 21,429 1,334 33,252 86,100 
1962 7,911 13,158 28,191 1,984 26,298 98,936 
1963 6,758 14,120 24,097 1,801 41,406 109,247 
1964 9,411 7,530 28,685 1,650 45,888 116,257 
1965 8,952 13,833 29,413 2,873 56,490 135,331 
Source: Kagoshima Prefecture Skipjack and Tuna Fisheries Cooperative Association. Kagoshima Ken Katsuo 
Maguro Gyogyô Kyôdô Kumiai Sôritsu Gojûnenshu Shi (Kagoshima Prefecture Skipjack and Tuna 
Fisheries Cooperative Association Fifty Year History). Tokyo: Suisan Shinshio Sha; 2000, p. 16. 
 
By the early 1980s the longline tuna catch had reached 15 per cent of the total value of 
Japanese fisheries and it remained at this level for most of the 1990s. In 1980 the value of 
the longline tuna catch was around ¥280 billion (US$1.3 billion) and in 1990 around ¥270 
billion (US$1.9 billion) [15 p.15]. Although Japan was no longer in danger of famine, 
government support for distant water tuna fishing continued because the industry suffered a 
range of setbacks. These setbacks included increasing fuel costs, restricted access to 
overseas fishing grounds through the declaration of marine territories (exclusive economic 
                                                 
6 ‘Tuna’ includes swordfish. 
7 ‘Mackerel’ includes horse mackerel. 
8 The figures for 1943 and 1944 were exactly the same in the original, probably indicating that one year has 
been transposed to the other, so 1943 and 1944 have been merged in this table. 
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zones) as part of the development of the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea, 
and increasing competition, especially from Korean and Taiwanese fishers. Support 
provided by government to the longline tuna industry to overcome these setbacks included 
price support schemes, low interest loans, fleet reconstruction schemes (to update 
technology), and structural adjustment [12, 15 p.14, 18 p.48].  
 
Government support included fleet reductions. In 1976 longline vessel owners were paid up 
to ¥163 million each (US$567,000) in a government program to retire their vessels [18 
p.48]. In 1980 the government and industry decided to reduce the longline fleet by 20 per 
cent, with government support [12 p.62, 15 p.14]. Then in 1987 ¥60 billion (US$417 
million) from the Japan Fisheries Agency (part of MAFF) budget was provided for low 
interest loans for tuna fishing vessel retirement [18 p.48].  
 
At the same time, large amounts of public money was also provided for upgrading the tuna 
fleet, even when the economic problems of the industry listed above, combined with 
declining stocks in many of the large tuna species meaning there were low or negative 
returns on capital [15 p.14]. Government subsidies for fleet upgrades concurrent with fleet 
reductions may explain why the buybacks were less than decisive in reducing the size of 
the fleet size operating in the Pacific Ocean over this period (see Table 2). According to the 
Kagoshima Prefectural Tuna Fisheries Cooperative Association, the fleet reductions in the 
1970s and 1980s should actually be seen as restructures, enabling the fleet to invest in more 
fuel-efficient boats and target higher value species [19 pp.429-33]. 
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Table 2. Number of Japanese Longline Vessels9 Operating in the Pacific Ocean 1955-
1991 
 
Year No. of Vessels 
1955 2,042 
1960 2,685 
1965 2,392 
1970 2,443 
  
1975 2,138 
(vessel buyback) 1976  2,223 
1977 2,154 
1978 2,149 
1979 2,143 
(vessel buyback) 1980 2,341 
1981 2,296 
1982 2,078 
1983 1,831 
1984 1,811 
1985 1,919 
1986 1,796 
(vessel buyback) 1987 1,878 
1989 1,809 
1990 1,838 
1991 1,890 
Source: Miyabe N, Ogura M, Matsumoto T, Nishikawa Y. National Tuna Fisheries Report of Japan as of 
2004. Paper presented to the 17th Meeting of the Standing Committee on Tuna and Billfish, 
Secretariat of the Pacific Community. Majuro, Marshall Islands, August 2004. Shimizu: National 
Research Institute of Far Seas Fisheries. 
 
Economists Campbell and Owen found that in 1987 the total subsidies to the tuna industry 
from the Japan Fisheries Agency (¥269 billion, US$1.8 billion) exceeded the losses 
incurred by the tuna fleet that year [18 p.48]. They also found that during the 1980s as a 
whole the Japanese distant water tuna fleet was operating at a loss to the extent that ‘it is 
difficult to believe the industry could have continued without such [government] 
assistance’ [18 p.49].  
 
Direct subsidies from the Japan Fisheries Agency to industry, however, are only part of the 
total government support for distant water tuna fisheries. Rural areas are politically 
important in Japan, both because of the historical concern with food security mentioned 
earlier, and because rural electorates are weighted more heavily than urban electorates and 
these rural electorates have been the heartland of the Liberal Democratic Party, which has 
                                                 
9 This includes vessels of all sizes, includes vessels engaged in trolling. 
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been in power almost continuously since 1955.10 Rural areas receive a range of government 
benefits from preferential tax treatment, to lower electricity charges, to public works for 
infrastructure development [9]. Many distant water tuna companies are based in rural areas, 
such as Kushikino in Kagoshima Prefecture, and Kesennuma in Miyagi Prefecture (see Fig. 
1).  
 
Fig. 1. Map of Japan 
 
                                                 
10 Rural areas are in decline, however, mostly from depopulation. For this reason among others they are less 
politically important than they were. 
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Fisheries specific government support comes through the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry 
and Fisheries (MAFF). MAFF connections to industry have been as problematic as any of 
the Ministries, with officials involved in scandals over ‘excessive’ wining and dining 
(settai) by industry and corruption during the 1990s, sparking public demands for reform of 
the Ministry and its governance [20 p.4, 21 p.171]. The MAFF sponsors a range of gaikaku 
dantai that support fisheries as well as other primary industries under the MAFF portfolio. 
MAFF has more chartered corporations (eight) than any other ministry [7 p.27]. Special 
corporations under MAFF supporting fisheries include the Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fisheries Groups Staff Members’ Mutual Aid Association (Nôringyogô Dantai Shokuin 
Kyôsai Kumiai, effectively a pension fund) that since the 1950s has been subsidized one 
third by the government. Insurance is also provided via the gaikaku dantai. Since the 1930s 
Japanese fishers have been insured against loss or damage of vessels, and since 1967 
against poor harvest, in a system administered by insurance associations at the prefectural 
level, and reinsured at the national level, and subsidized by the national government [22 
pp.31-32]. According to Fujinami, in the late 1980s just over half of Japan’s fishing vessels 
were insured through ‘special government insurance programs’ [12 pp.66-67].11 Gaikaku 
dantai also provide financial services including venture finance. There is the Fisheries 
Resources Development Corporation (Suishigen Kaihatsu Kôdan) [9 p.115] and MAFF 
also supports the Nôrinchûkin Bank (Nôrin Chûo Kinkô), which provides financial services 
for agriculture forestry and fisheries employees and businesses.12 For high risk projects the 
Nôrinchûkin Bank or other financial organizations cannot fund, low interest capital is 
provided by the Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Finance Corporation (Nôringyogyô 
Kinyû Kôko), which is subsidized by the central government through the main MAFF 
budget, and through something called the Government Affiliated Agencies budget, as well 
as through the Fiscal Investment Loan Program (FILP) [9 p.114].13  
 
                                                 
11 For example the Seamen’s Insurance Foundation Zaidan Hôjin Senin Hoken Kai, see www.sempos.or.jp 
(accessed 22 March 2005). 
12 See http://www.nochubank.or.jp/business/02.shtml (accessed 14 March 2005).  
13 In Japanese the FILP is Zaisei Tôyûshi Keikaku, or Zaitô. FILP money comes not from taxation revenue, 
but from the post office savings account pool, to which the Japanese government has access for spending on 
public projects and programs. The FILP is immense, it has long been the largest savings pool in the world. 
Because it is so commonly used for government spending the FILP is also called the ‘second budget’. 
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Fishing industry associations also direct government money flows to industry. Up until the 
1960s the Dai Nippon Suisan Kai had been the premier industry body for distant water tuna 
as well as other fisheries, but from the 1960s another industry group the Nippon Katsuo 
Maguro Gyogyô Kyôdô Kumiai Rengô Kai (Federation of Japan Tuna Fisheries 
Cooperative Associations, also called Japan Tuna and Nikkatsuren) came to the fore as the 
main industry body for the distant water tuna fisheries, including longlining. By the 1990s 
Nikkatsuren represented 89 per cent of Japan’s distant water tuna fishers [15 p.17]. The Dai 
Nippon Suisankai operates at the national level, but Nikkatsuren and the fisheries 
cooperative associations (Gyokyô) have an active presence at three levels; municipal, 
prefectural and national (see Figs. 2 and 3). Nikkatsuren and the Gyokyô undertake a wide 
range of functions including: administering payrolls for fishers; recruitment; managing 
employment contracts; setting employment conditions; coordinating financial services 
through the Nôrinchûkin Bank; providing and managing port infrastructure; freighting, 
distributing and marketing fisheries products; conducting related enterprises such as the 
provisioning of fuel and fishing equipment; managing overseas access to ports and fishing 
grounds (Nikkatsuren); lobbying; and representing industry in policy advisory committees 
(such as shingikai and kondankai). The extent to which the gaikaku dantai act as connective 
tissue between industry and government are revealed by this range of activities, because it 
includes tasks that might otherwise be done by government, as well as tasks that might 
otherwise be done by businesses themselves. 
 
 
 
Fig. 2 Fisheries Cooperative Associations and Tuna Boat Owners’ Associations  
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Almost all people working in fisheries in Japan belong to their local Gyokyô. In addition, 
tuna boat owners belong to tuna industry associations, Nikkatsuren or the National Ocean 
Tuna Fisheries Association (Zenkoku Enyô Katsuo Maguro Gyogyôsha Kyô Kai, or 
Kinkatsuren). Kinkatsuren offers similar services to Nikkatsuren but Nikkatsuren is larger 
and more powerful.14 Many tuna boat owners belong to both tuna associations as well as 
their local Gyokyô.  
 
According to MAFF officials interviewed for this research, Nikkatsuren representatives and 
Fisheries Agency bureaucrats work very closely in developing and implementing policy 
regarding distant water tuna fisheries through meetings at which each side presents their 
positions and then negotiates towards a consensus position. The outcome of this process 
becomes policy. Ministers are not usually involved in developing policy; policies are 
mostly worked out between the bureaucrats of the Fisheries Agency and Nikkatsuren.15 
Nikkatsuren and the Fisheries Agency also work together to monitor and regulate the 
distant water fleet’s tuna catch. For example, for the southern bluefin tuna fishery, which 
has a national quota for member countries set by the Commission for the Conservation of 
Southern Bluefin Tuna, the quota sits with the Fisheries Agency as representative of 
government, yet it is Nikkatsuren that licenses longline tuna fishing companies to enter that 
fishery.16 So the fishery is very much co-managed by government and the industry body, as 
is usual for fisheries in Japan [22 pp.51-55]. 
 
Fishing industry bodies are sites for amakudari. Local branches of the tuna associations are 
headed by fishermen, but ‘industry’ people per se do not hold executive office at the 
prefectural and national level of the tuna associations. Executive and senior staff positions 
at the higher levels are predominantly held by former or seconded Fisheries Agency 
bureaucrats. For example, Ueda Yamato had a career in the Fisheries Agency, ending up as 
head of the Pelagic Fishery Department. Upon retirement Ueda became President of 
                                                 
14 Nikkatsuren’s relative importance is demonstrated by the fact that Nikkatsuren representatives are listed 
above Kinkatsuren representatives in the lists of delegates for international tuna commission meetings. See 
the Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna www.ccsbt.org/docs/meeting_r.html 
(accessed 22 March 2005). 
15 Interview with Tamai Tetsuya, Japanese Embassy, Canberra, April 2003. 
16 Interview with Mae Akihiro, Fisheries Agency, Tokyo, January 2003. 
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Nikkatsuren in 1985, a position he held for more than 15 years. Other post retirement 
positions Ueda has held include Managing Director of the Overseas Fishery Cooperation 
Foundation and Managing Director of the Dai Nippon Suisan Kai [23]. Since ex-
bureaucrats have connections of influence over current bureaucrats in MAFF via their 
status as senior (sempai), their post-retirement positions tie the industry bodies very closely 
to MAFF.17 Bodies like Nikkatsuren do not purely represent industry, they may also be said 
to represent MAFF.  
 
Furthermore, large industry associations in Japan may develop their own corporate interests 
[9 pp. 64-69]. Nikkatsuren employs hundreds of administrative staff, is largely led by ex-
bureaucrats, and has its own revenue raising enterprises. It is understandable Nikkatsuren 
could develop a corporate identity somewhat at variance with its tuna fishing company 
membership. When we interviewed Japanese longline tuna company owners in 2002-3 
several owners often said they wished the Australian government would lift the ban on 
Japanese fishing vessels from docking at Australian ports. In fact, in May 2001 The 
Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs Alexander Downer had announced the ‘immediate 
lifting of the bans currently in place on Japanese fishing vessels visiting Australian ports’ 
[24], and this was reported in an Australia-focused Japanese language wire service [25]. 
Yet a year or two later many Japanese tuna boat owners thought the ban was still in place. 
Clearly Nikkatsuren had not effectively disseminated information about the lifting of the 
ban to its membership. One possible reason for this is that in the years Japanese tuna 
vessels had been operating in the southern Indian and Pacific Oceans without being able to 
dock and refuel in Australian ports, Nikkatsuren developed its method for refueling 
longliners at sea. Some Australian tuna boat owner interviewees expressed the opinion that 
Nikkatsuren has a vested interest in Japanese longliners not using Australian ports, so 
Nikkatsuren can maintain its business provisioning fuel to the longliners.18 Certainly, 
Nikkatsuren’s failure to effectively disseminate accurate information about the lifting of the 
ban seems somewhat at odds with Japanese tuna longline industry interests.  
                                                 
17 Senior/junior (sempai/kōhai) relations are a fundamental organizing principle in Japanese society. 
18 Various Australian tuna fishing and aquaculture company owners interviewed in 2002-3. 
Fig. 3 Dai Nippon Suisan Kai (Great Japan Fisheries Association) 
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Although Nikkatsuren supplanted the Dai Nippon Suisan Kai as the leading body for 
distant water tuna fisheries in the 1960s, the Dai Nippon Suisan Kai is still important, partly 
because it has exceedingly high connections to government. The Honorary President of the 
Dai Nippon Suisan Kai, until his death in 2004, was former Prime Minister Suzuki 
Zenko.19 Members of the imperial family have always been involved with the organization. 
In addition to having such high government connections, the Dai Nippon Suisan Kai 
membership is made up of hundreds of organizations from all facets of Japan’s marine 
industries from fishing to trading, processing, shipping, marketing, and investing [26]. This 
large, broad and high-ranking membership means the Dai Nippon Suisan Kai is a useful 
forum for cross-sector collaboration on fisheries issues. This has enabled it to be 
instrumental in the establishment of several important gaikaku dantai [13].  
 
The current President of the Dai Nippon Suisan Kai, Nakasu Isao, is concurrently President 
of the gaikaku dantai Organization for the Promotion of Responsible Tuna fisheries (OPRT, 
Sekininaru Maguro Gyogyô Suishin Kikô). The OPRT was established in 2000 to 
coordinate cross-sector initiatives to conserve tuna resources. OPRT lists the important 
stakeholders as tuna fishing organizations (including the Taiwan Tuna Boat Owners 
Association and Nikkatsuren), tuna trading organizations and consumer groups [27]. Under 
the auspices of OPRT these organizations work together to prevent the sale in Japan of tuna 
from Illegal Unregistered and Unreported (IUU) or Flag of Convenience (FOC) vessels, 
which means tuna caught outside the regulations of the international tuna management 
institutions. They work closely with the Japan Fisheries Agency to do this, for example by 
helping to develop and implement the ‘positive list’ system by which only tuna caught from 
vessels that are listed as abiding by international management and conservation rules 
should be imported [27 p.2].20  
 
The preceding passages show that from the inception of modern distant water fisheries 
more than a century ago, Japanese tuna fisheries have been co-managed by government and 
                                                 
19 Suzuki had originally studied fisheries at college, and then worked in organizations connected to the fishing 
industry until entering politics in 1947. He was the Minister of MAFF for several years in the 1970s, before 
becoming Prime Minister in 1980. 
20 The legislation for regulating imports is the 1996 Law on Special Measures for the Promotion of the 
Conservation and Management of Tuna Stocks, also called the Tuna Management Act. 
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industry, and this governance has always involved extensive use of government money to 
support industry. The next section of this paper examines recent developments in three 
major areas of government support for fisheries - gaikaku dantai, public works, and direct 
subsidies – to see whether neoliberal reforms are affecting this pattern of governance.  
 
2.3 Neoliberalism in the Gaikaku Dantai? 
Privatization is a key neoliberal reform, but there has been very little privatization of 
fisheries related gaikaku dantai. The Norinchukin Bank was ‘privatized’ in 1986, but in 
2000 most of the executive and staff of the bank continued to be seconded or retired MAFF 
bureaucrats, and the bank continued to be subject to MAFF direction via regulations [9 
p.115]. 
 
After long having been considered a best practice model of resource governance [28] the 
Japanese fisheries cooperative association system has since the early 1990s been widely 
recognized as having serious problems. Forty per cent of municipal Gyokyô are in deficit 
and have been since 1993 [22 pp.42-48]. Other problems include the aging of the workforce 
and a lack of young people willing to go into fishing as a career, meaning declining 
industries and memberships. Several solutions to the problems of the Gyokyô are offered in 
a booklet on Japanese fisheries authored by prominent fisheries academics as well as a 
manager from Zengyoren (the peak body for local fisheries cooperative associations) and 
the Managing Director of the OPRT. No mention is made of reducing the level of 
government support, or reforming the relationships between government and business via 
the Gyokyô and other industry associations. Remedies proposed for fiscal mismanagement 
are to improve the training of Gyokyô employees, and to reduce costs through downsizing 
and rationalizing Gyokyô [22 pp.42-48].  
 
Rationalization is another key neoliberal policy, but like privatization it has not advanced 
far in fisheries related gaikaku dantai. Rationalizing the Gyokyô system by reducing the 
number of municipal Gyokyô (every fishing municipality has had its own Gyokyô) was 
actually tabled as far back as the 1970s when the government and Zengyoren wanted to 
amalgamate smaller Gyokyô with larger ones [14 p.143]. Then in the late 1990s the dozens 
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of municipal Gyokyô in each prefecture were due to be merged into single prefectural level 
bodies, with branch offices in key fishing municipalities.21 Failure to substantially 
rationalize the Gyokyô despite rationalization being on the agenda for 30 years indicates 
substantial resistance to rationalization in the Gyokyô, meaning it may still not occur for 
some time.  
 
2.4 Neoliberalism in Public Works? 
One of Koizumi’s pledges for economic reform has been to stop the wasteful public works 
projects that have been one of the hallmarks of Liberal Democratic Party dominance, 
especially in geo-electorally important rural areas. Public works are desired because of the 
economic benefits large construction projects can bring. Impressive constructions can also 
bring status and civic pride for regional towns, helping them aspire to the image of modern 
Japan. During the 1990s, in a failed attempt to reverse the recession, the Japanese 
government spent ¥120 trillion in fiscal stimulus packages, much of which was 
unfortunately spent on public works that did not usefully serve the Japanese populace [7 
p.119]. The MAFF in particular responded to the recession by increasing public spending to 
more than 50 per cent of the budget [21 pp.171-74]. Some of the spending on public works 
was for infrastructure for distant water tuna fisheries.  
 
Kushikino, a small city in Kagoshima Prefecture in the south of Kyûshû (see Fig. 1) has 
long been a distant water tuna port (see Table 3), and it represents itself as a tuna town. For 
example, in the early 2000s there was a regional tourism program called ‘Maguro Râmen’, 
involving seven local restaurants developing and selling a new noodle soup dish – tuna 
ramen. Nikkatsuren and a group called the Kushikino Maguro Râmen Kyôei Kai (Kushikino 
Tuna Mutual Prosperity Society) produced a Maguro Râmen Map to show visitors where 
the restaurants selling tuna ramen were, in relation to other notable features and tourist 
spots in the city. Participating restaurants had brightly colored flags advertising Maguro 
Râmen flying outside their doors as part of the promotion.  
                                                 
21 This was according to Kagoshima Kengyoren (the prefectural level between the municipal Gyokyô and the 
national peak body Zengyoren) officials during a fisheries study tour organized by the Kagoshima University 
Marine Social Science Department for visiting scholars from Indonesia and the Philippines, 19-21 November 
1998. 
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Table 3. Distant Water Tuna Fleets: Kushikino City, Kagoshima Prefecturen and 
Japan 1976-1987 (No. of Vessels, Catch in Metric Tons, Catch Value in ¥’000,00022) 
 
 Kushikino Kagoshima Japan 
 Vessels23 Vessels Catch Value Vessels24 Catch Value 
1976 (42) 45 (73) 9,738 93,700 923 192,665 1,499,900 
1977 (44) 42 (69) 11,509 102,400 910 202,097 1,857,800 
1978 (42) 45 (73) 10,239 87,400 880 201,835 1,605,600 
1979 (44) 49 (75) 9,158 121,500 900 205,042 2,208,000 
1980 (48) 55 (72) 10,612 122,000 943 211,997 2,127,400 
1981 (50) 60 (71) 13,212 171,100 964 205,651 2,097,200 
1982 (55) 68 (76) 13,212 152,000 854 217,710 2,397,900 
1983 (62) 74 (80) 17,360 197,700 770 220,335 2,452,300 
1984 (66) 77 (81) 17,567 227,000 761 222,572 2,707,000 
1985 (67) 75 (81) 19,643 224,000 773 232,704 2,585,200 
1986 (69) 72 (83) 23,130 273,700 771 229,035 2,301,100 
1987 (66) 75 (78) 23,250 212,200 770 201,781 1,904,700 
 
Sources: Kagoshima Ken Katsuo Maguro Gyogyô Kyôdô Kumiai (Kagoshima Prefecture Skipjack and Tuna 
Fisheries Cooperative Association). Kagoshima Ken Katsuo Maguro Gyogyô Kyôdô Kumiai Sôritsu 
Gojûnenshu Shi (Kagoshima Prefecture Skipjack and Tuna Fisheries Cooperative Association Fifty 
Year History). Tokyo: Suisan Shinshio Sha; 2000, p.430. Fushuku Miyoshi. Kushikino Gyogyô Shi 
(Kushikino Fisheries History). Kagoshima: Kushikino Shi Gyogyô Kyôdô Kumiai (Kushikino City 
Fisheries Cooperative Association); 1989, p. 364.  
 
 
Kushikino City Hall lists tuna as one of Kushikino’s specialities (tokusanhin) [29 p.20]. A 
City Hall pamphlet from 2002 displays the recently completed outer harbor center top in an 
aerial photograph of the city, juxtaposed with the City Hall’s three future-oriented 
machizukuri slogans, one of which reads: ‘aiming for a town developing in the 21st century, 
                                                 
22 The exchange rates of the yen increased greatly over this period; from 1976 USD$1 = JPY¥305 to 1987 
USD$1 = JPY¥158. 
23 The numbers in parentheses are from Fushuku, the rest are from Kagoshima Ken Katsuo Maguro Gyogyô 
Kyôdô Kumiai. We have distinguished the two sources this way because there are large discrepancies 
between the two sets of figures. Fushuku’s original source is company records from Seto Suisan. Kagoshima 
Ken Katsuo Maguro Gyogyô Kyôdô Kumiai’s figures are based on their own records. One possible 
explanation for the discrepancy is that although both sources list types of vessel as enyô maguro (distant water 
tuna) the criteria for this category may have varied between these two organizations. Despite the discrepancy 
raising questions about the reliability of the figures, we have included this table to roughly indicate the 
relative status of Kushikino as a tuna port in Japan. 
24 The numbers of vessels listed here are much lower than those listed for the same period by Miyabe et al. in 
Table 2. This is odd since the figures in Table 2 are only for longliners and trolling vessels operating in the 
Pacific Ocean, while the figures here are for all gear types in all distant water fishing grounds, so should be 
greater. Miyabe et al. based their figures on annual catch statistics from the Ministry of Agriculture Forestry 
and Fisheries. Kagoshima Ken Katsuo Maguro Gyogyô Kyôdô Kumiai based their figures on numbers of 
licenses issued by the Japan Fisheries Agency, under the same Ministry. 
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vital infrastructure for the city’s potential’ (authors’ translation) [29 pp.22-23].25 Photos of 
tuna longliners are featured in a City Hall brochure representing local fisheries, along with 
this passage: 
The fishery of Kushikino City centers around deep-sea tuna fishing and the coastal 
fishery. We have improved fishing ports and fishery-related facilities, and are 
working hard to make a mother port base for tuna fishing as well to revitalize the 
coastal fishery to combat the industry’s difficulties (authors’ translation) [29 pp.32-
33]. 
 
The outer harbor was specifically built for longliners because the inner harbor used by all 
the other local fisheries was too small. The outer harbor project was first announced in 
1971, and various aspects of the project, such as wharfing facilities and cold storage were 
built in stages during the 1970s and 1980s [30]. During that time fewer and fewer of the 
Kushikino fleet were landing their catch and taking on fuel, gear and bait at Kushikino. 
Instead many of them came and went from Shimizu and Yaizu, which are close to Tokyo, 
making the overland transport of fresh/frozen fish to the main market in Tokyo easier (see 
Fig. 1 and Table 4). As the Japanese tuna industry consolidated operations at Shimizu and 
Yaizu these ports also became cheaper than Kushikino for fuel, gear, bait and other 
supplies. Yet still construction of the outer harbor proceeded during the 1980s and 1990s. 
By the year 2000 no longliners had been landing their catch at Kushikino for years, 
although around 20 companies based their offices and registered their vessels in Kushikino, 
and some longliners docked there once every five years or so for repairs. All of the people 
we interviewed in Kushikino, including officials in City Hall, knew that the longliners did 
not use Kushikino as their regular port, and none suggested this would change in the future. 
There are sound reasons the City Hall might want to claim identity with the tuna industry, 
and want to attract large public works. The Kushikino outer harbor, however, seems to be 
the kind of problematic public work Koizumi has pledged to reform. 
 
                                                 
25 Machizukuri, literally ‘town-making’, is a local government activity (often funded by the national 
government in rural areas) aimed at generating a communal sense of place and belonging. It involves slogans, 
public buildings and events coordinated around central themes. 
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Table 4. Kushikino Tuna Boats Loading Patterns by Port 1986 
 
 No. vessels 
using port 
Fuel Bait Gear Food Others Total 
 # ¥’000,000 
Shimizu 40 690 1,156 372 303 443 2,966 
Yaizu 14 212 374 189 96 142 1,016 
Kushikino 25 53 370 47 70 277 821 
Misaki 1 10 11 1 3 1 133 
Shiogama 1 11 - - - - 11 
Kesennuma 1 7 - - - - 7 
Total 82 983 1,911 609 472 959 4,954 
 
Source: Fushuku Miyoshi. Kushikino Gyogyô Shi (Kushikino Fisheries History). Kagoshima: Kushikino Shi 
Gyogyô Kyôdô Kumiai (Kushikino City Fisheries Cooperative Association); 1989, p. 180. 
 
 
2.5 Neoliberalism in Fleet Reductions? 
Previous discussion outlined government subsidies for structural adjustments to the tuna 
longline industry during the 1970s and 1980s. For the last five years the longline fleet has 
again been in serious financial trouble, and structural adjustment has been one solution 
tabled. This has dovetailed with increased efforts to respond to international criticism of the 
environmental effects of longline tuna fishing. In 1999 the United Nations Food and 
Agriculture Organization recommended that the world long lining fleet should be reduced 
immediately by 20 to 30 per cent in order to counteract over fishing of large tuna species 
for the sashimi market [31]. The Japanese tuna industry responded by announcing a 
reduction in the Japanese fleet by this proportion over the next couple of years. The vessel 
owners whose boats were scrapped as part of this fleet reduction were compensated through 
a government sponsored boat buy-back scheme. Nikkatsuren administered the fleet 
reduction by selecting companies that looked weak, either because of lack of profits or lack 
of a successor to carry on the company, and sent instructions down the line to the 
prefectural level then the municipal level that those companies would surrender their 
vessels.26 According to Sato Yasuo of Nikkatsuren the buy-back scheme cost 
USD$335,000,000 (JPY¥40,025,800,000 at a 2001 exchange rate) of which 70 per cent was 
                                                 
26 Interview with Sugai Hiroshi of the Kagoshima Prefecture Skipjack and Tuna Fisheries Cooperative 
Association, June 2003. 
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funded by public money.27 This example shows that in recent years direct subsidies are still 
as much a tool of governance in Japanese tuna fisheries as they were during the twentieth 
century. 
 
These examples from the tuna longline industry support the conclusions of researchers who 
have been following the general theme of structural reform in Japanese governance. 
Koizumi and predecessors who promised reform have made only limited headway in 
reducing the capacity of the ministries to disperse public money and cement corporatist 
relations via the gaikaku dantai [5 pp.25-33, 7, 20 p.5]. One explanation for this is that 
Prime Minister and Cabinet do not have effective control over either the Liberal 
Democratic Party or the bureaucracy, so reform directives can be ignored [5 p.23]. It should 
be pointed out that the reform agenda is progressing differently in different ministries. For 
example, there is evidence that the Ministry of Economics, Trade and Industry (formerly 
MITI) has arguably taken the reform agenda on board, is deregulating and focusing 
government assistance to industries that are competitive [32,33]. MAFF, however, seems 
less inclined to adopt Koizimi’s reforms [21].  
 
Structures of material incentives, however, are not the whole picture. Public policy is also 
influenced by the philosophies underpinning it. For example, ideas about what is ‘good’ 
governance and what kinds of government actions are considered il/legitimate also affect 
governance. The following section explores ideas about governance in representations from 
key stakeholders in tuna industries, in order to estimate the normative strength of neoliberal 
discourses relative to other philosophical frameworks and thus the likelihood that key 
stakeholders will champion neoliberal reforms. 
 
3. GOVERNANCE PHILOSOPHY 
Ever since Japan entered into the modernization race with the Western powers in the late 
1800s, the belief that Japan is a resource poor country has influenced political and 
                                                 
27 Sato Yasuo’s reply to authors’ question in a panel discussion on vessel buy-backs as a fisheries 
management tool during the biennial conference of the International Institute of Fisheries Economics and 
Trade in Tokyo, July 2004. 
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economic decisions. Famines, especially those after World War II, have been used to 
support the argument that Japan should have self-sufficiency in basic foodstuffs. An 
opinion poll by the Prime Minister’s Office in 2000 found that 78 per cent of Japanese were 
concerned about the stability of food supplies in the future, and 95 per cent called for the 
government to ensure national food security [34]. The mass media disseminates the 
discourse of dependency on imports, helping to keep fear about food security alive [35 
p.167], even though famine seems a highly unlikely scenario in contemporary Japan. This 
argument in relation to government support of Japanese rice production is well known.28 
The same principles are invoked with regard to Japanese fisheries, including distant water 
tuna fisheries. The special place of food production in Japan’s political landscape plays a 
significant role in legitimizing government support for Japan’s distant water tuna fisheries. 
 
We interviewed members of the non-government consumers’ organization Shôdanren for 
their views on sashimi tuna.29 The Shôdanren members said Japanese consumers tend to 
prefer domestically produced food because they believe that it is more likely to be healthy 
and safe to eat than food produced overseas. They also said Japanese consumers believe 
some goods, such as sashimi tuna, are better quality when produced by Japanese than by 
non-Japanese. They said Japanese consumers are willing to pay up to 50 per cent more for 
domestic rather than imported food.30 The Shôdanren members raised the issue of Japan’s 
low rate of food self-sufficiency, saying they felt the current rate of 40 per cent domestic 
food production was too low, and that Japanese consumers felt that a rate of ‘80 something 
per cent’ self-sufficiency in food was the right level.  
 
The Shôdanren discussion of food self-sufficiency ended with a strong statement from one 
of the interviewees saying that globalization was going too far and that she felt it 
reasonable that ‘Japanese citizens’ should defend their food self-sufficiency. The word she 
used for ‘citizen’ in this outburst was ‘kokumin’, literally ‘nation-people’. Other words she 
could have used are ‘consumer’ (shôhisha) or another word for ‘citizen’ ‘shimin’ (literally 
                                                 
28 For a thorough examination of the politics of Japanese agriculture see George Mulgan 2000 [9]. 
29 Zenkoku Shôhisha Dantai Renraku Kai, usually referred to as Shōdanren, or ‘Consumers Japan’ in English. 
Interview with Kanda Toshiko, Itō Yasue and Hasuo Takako in Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo, May 2003. 
30 According to Bestor [35 pp.168-9] seafood products labeled ‘kokusan’ (‘made in Japan’) have higher prices 
and prestige in the Tsukiji market. 
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‘city-people’), which is often used for ‘citizen’ in a civil society sense, such as in ‘citizens’ 
movements’ (shimin undô). Her choice of the word ‘kokumin’ shows the consumer 
nationalism undercurrent pervading the food security and food self-sufficiency debates in 
Japan.31
 
Patricia Maclachlan has theorized a kokumin aspect of Japanese consumer identity, arguing 
that historical developments during the twentieth century caused Japanese consumers to be 
politically different to consumers in the English speaking world [36]. Before and during 
World War II part of the difference was that consumption was seen by many Japanese as 
shameful waste, because of an ethic of personal frugality in order to be able to devote 
resources to the national endeavor. Then in the postwar period, with famines and chaos as 
Japan rebuilt itself, consumers sided with producers in a joint effort to achieve national 
food self-sufficiency. Consumers thus developed a ‘survivor’ identity that was teamed on 
the same side as, rather than in opposition to, food producers. This post war survivor 
consumer identity again connoted a sense of pulling together for the nation. Maclachlan 
notes that the ‘survivor’ kokumin aspect to Japanese consumer identity that has meant 
consumers’ movements have done apparently paradoxical things like supported agricultural 
protectionism, which means they pay several times the world price for rice.  
 
The Tokyo-based consumers’ group Women’s Forum for Fish (WFF, in Japanese Ūmanzu 
Fuôramu Sakana) also represents fisheries issues with a kokumin aspect to consumer 
identity like that of the interviewee from Shôdanren. Shiraishi Yuriko started the WFF 
organization in 1993 after realizing the extent of Japan’s reliance on seafood imports,32 
                                                 
31 Labelling social features in Japan ‘nationalist’ can be very contentious because of undesirable associations 
with Imperial Japan’s militarist ultranationalism, and continuing sentiments along these lines held by small 
numbers of uyoku right wing groups. The nationalisms described in this paper are neither militarist nor 
ultranationalist, but are the ‘banal’ forms of nationalism discussed by M Billig in Banal Nationalism (London: 
Sage; 1999) that are endemic in the contemporary normative system of nation-states. We are not trying to 
make the case that Japan is any more nationalist than other countries, rather we aim to identify the roles 
played by everyday forms of cultural nationalism, economic nationalism and consumer nationalism in the 
governance of Japan’s distant water tuna fisheries, both as it currently operates and in thinking about 
potentials for change. This discussion of Japanese nationalisms borrows from T. McVeigh’s Nationalisms of 
Japan: Managing and Mystifying Identity (Lanham, Maryland, U.S.A.: Rowman and Littlefield; 2004). 
32 According to MAFF Japan imports 60 per cent of its food supplies, measured in caloric intake [34]. In the 
1970s Japan was the worlds largest seafood exporter, by 2001 Japan had become the worlds largest seafood 
importer, with 23% in value and 14% in volume of world production [22]. 
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because she felt Japanese consumers should be better educated about this important part of 
their diet. Shiraishi’s consumer identity resonates with that detailed by Maclachlan when 
she noted that kokumin identity was ‘rarely evoked in movement discourse’ (because it is 
an explicitly nationalist term which sits uneasily with progressive social movements in 
post-war Japan) but is nonetheless visible in activities and attitudes [36]. In written material 
Shiraishi uses the word shôhisha (consumer), not kokumin [37]. In her spoken 
representations, however, she does use the word kokumin.33 Economic and cultural 
nationalisms are evident in various representations she makes about fisheries issues, 
interwoven with internationalism.  
 
Shiraishi allies consumers not only with Japanese producers, but with producers the world 
over who supply the Japanese market. She wants to establish dialogue with seafood 
producers everywhere in order to educate Japanese consumers. She calls for an alliance 
between tuna producers, governments, traders and consumers against the IUU and FOC 
tuna fishers, who endanger stocks and undermine tuna fisheries operating in accordance 
with international and national measures to protect stocks [38,39]. This aspect of 
Shiraishi’s representation is internationalist. 
 
Shiraishi also calls for an alliance of ‘fish food culture’ (gyoshoku bunka) countries of Asia 
against the hegemony of the ‘meat food culture’ countries of Europe and North America. 
As well as being legitimized in terms of food security, government support for tuna 
fisheries is legitimized in rhetoric about the need to preserve cultural heritage in certain 
food production areas [16 p.167]. Food is a prominent part of culture at all levels in 
Japanese society, and is used as a marker of cultural identity, both for regional differences 
within Japan and between Japanese and foreigners [35]. Fish food culture - the arts of 
fishing, preparing and consuming fish - is seen by many as an essential part of 
Japaneseness. One way this form of national identity may be asserted is through 
representations of Japan having a fish food culture versus the meat food culture of the 
                                                 
33 Shiraishi’s spoken representation was observed when she spoke in a panel at the biennial conference of the 
International Institute for Fisheries Economics and Trade in Tokyo, July 2004. 
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‘West’ [35,40]. The fish food culture aspect of Shiraishi’s representation is thus both 
internationalist and cultural nationalist. 
 
Economic nationalism is evident in Shiraishi’s assertion that increasing world population 
will put pressure on food stocks such that there will be a ‘fish war’ (osakana sensô) in the 
twenty-first century. She asks Japan what it will do regarding this situation (dô suru, 
Nihon?). She deplores the fact that Japanese consumers feel no sense of danger that half of 
their seafood is imported and predicts that soon it will not be possible to buy fish from 
other countries [37].  
 
Consumers’ allegiance with domestic producers because of fears about food security and 
desires to preserve Japanese fish food culture in Japanese consumer discourse helps 
legitimize continued government assistance to distant water tuna fisheries. Bureaucrats 
governing distant water tuna fisheries usually represent the issues similarly to the consumer 
activists quoted above. Komatsu Masayuki has been a key figure in Japanese distant water 
fisheries governance over the last decade. A senior bureaucrat with the MAFF, he has been 
the Japanese Head of Delegation in international tuna management commissions and also 
been a vocal presence at meetings of the International Whaling Commission meetings. 
Komatsu is more outspoken than many of his colleagues but it is fair to say he represents 
the prevailing public policy philosophy of the Japanese government regarding distant water 
fisheries.34 According to Komatsu: 
Japan cannot continue simply relying on imported food. Can we afford as a country 
to be dependent on others, such as the United States or Australia, for our basic 
foods? Will we always have enough precious dollars to import what we need? It is 
the answers to these questions that should tell you why I firmly believe that we need 
to become more self-sufficient for reason of our national health and at the most 
basic level, to guarantee the supply of food to our people [as quoted in 41, 
translation R. Smith]. 
 
Komatsu’s representation is nationalist in that his ‘us’ and ‘our’ signify Japan, not some 
transnational alliance of fish consumers or producers. He usually frames issues along 
                                                 
34 According to Hirata, opinion on whaling in MAFF is not unified, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs often 
disagrees with MAFF stances taken on whaling, but the pro-whaling group, lead by Komatsu, is dominant and 
their agenda prevails [40]. Komatsu’s position vis a vis MAFF on tuna issues is similar. 
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national lines in terms of ‘us’ versus ‘them’.35 In Komatsu’s vision the role of fisheries 
governance is to promote Japanese fisheries for the sake of the Japanese nation. This vision 
legitimizes government support for fisheries, which is antithetical to neoliberalism. 
Komatsu’s vision is also incompatible with neoliberalism in that he is anti-globalization in 
terms of fisheries trade liberalization.36 He has said that ‘Japan does not need 
globalization’, and that importing ‘too much’ tuna is ‘bad for Japan’.37 Other MAFF 
officials also assert that national interest should be balanced against globalization. In 
response to calls for further trade liberalization under the World Trade Organization MAFF 
has said ‘further radical reforms will … deteriorate food self sufficiency and 
multifunctional benefits. This must be a huge loss for the Japanese and their national 
economy.’ [34, italics added].  
 
While national boundaries are emphasized in these representations, not only are boundaries 
between producers and consumers underplayed, boundaries between industry and 
government are also underplayed. In a neoliberal vision government and industry are 
normatively distinguished from each other as different kinds of institutions, which should 
be kept separate. The vision demonstrated in the MAFF representations above is more 
corporatist than neoliberal. The first section of this paper showed the corporatist structure 
of relations between business and government, especially via the gaikaku dantai. These 
MAFF representations show the normative counterparts to those structures.  
 
If neoliberal discourses had much salience in this context the close relationship between 
business and government in fisheries would be represented as a bad thing, or at least the 
representations would contain some kind of attempt to justify the close relationship, but 
Japanese fisheries stakeholders usually represent the close relationship positively. For 
                                                 
35 This style generates political capital in that domestic contesting voices can be devalued because they seem 
to be against the nation. Hirata [40 p.194] notes the political device of framing issues as ‘us’ versus ‘them’ in 
the whaling dispute has helped marginalize domestic anti-whaling voices. 
36 Komatsu is not anti-globalization in terms of access for Japan’s offshore and distant water fleets. Indeed, 
since Japan’s domestic fishing grounds are fully exploited, unless there is a major increase in aquaculture, his 
call for greater food self-sufficiency must logically mean additional Japanese fishing in overseas fishing 
grounds. Thanks to Quentin Grafton for pointing this out. 
37 These comments were made by Komatsu in a panel discussion at the biennial conference of the 
International Institute for Fisheries Economics and Trade in Tokyo, July 2004. 
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example, in a booklet explaining Japan’s fisheries produced by fisheries bureaucrats, 
academics and gaikaku dantai industry representatives for an international fisheries 
conference held in 2004, the close relationship between government and industry is 
presented as a unique form of fisheries co-management that enables local fishers to 
participate effectively in governance [22 p.51-55]. The booklet contains the following 
statement about problems in Japanese fisheries seen as being caused by globalization: ‘the 
Japanese government and the fishing industries doing their utmost to maintain these 
industries’ (italics added) [22 p.95]. According to neoliberal principles governments should 
not try to maintain industries if they are unable to prosper in competition with the rest of 
the world, rather they should be allowed to decline. So the authors of this booklet are 
clearly not significantly influenced by neoliberal ideas.  
 
Moreover, the concern with food self sufficiency that pervades representations of fisheries 
governance issues in Japan runs counter to neoliberalism. In a neoliberal vision food 
security is ensured by generating wealth so people can buy their food from wherever 
producers can produce it most cost effectively. Neoliberalism requires faith in the wealth 
generating and distributing capacities of international trade, and it also requires faith that 
international lines of supply will remain open. Japanese governance philosophy as evident 
in discourses around distant water tuna fisheries has faith in trade bolstered by a supportive 
state rather than faith in trade alone. The philosophy that legitimizes government support 
for Japanese distant water tuna fisheries because of concerns about food security and self-
sufficiency is more neomercantilist than neoliberal. Various kinds of nationalism, 
corporatism and anti-globalization are more apparent influences than neoliberalism on 
prevailing public policy philosophy in this sector in Japan. 
 
Considering the prevalence of neoliberalism in policy circles internationally, the lack of 
neoliberal norms in Japanese public policy surrounding the governance of distant water 
tuna fisheries is striking. Hirata’s work on norm diffusion with regard to whaling helps 
explain this phenomenon [40]. She argues that the prevailing international anti-whaling 
norm has not diffused to Japan because the domestic political context has not been 
amenable to this norm. In fact, not only did the norm not diffuse, domestic resistance was 
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inspired against it. Resistance was inspired because the international anti-whaling norm was 
framed as an attack on Japanese culture.  
 
There are some parallels with whaling in the tuna situation. Environmental organizations 
such as Greenpeace, which are identified as Western in Japan, campaign against tuna long 
lining and accuse Japan of eating ‘too much’ tuna. Greenpeace’s stance is resented as anti-
Japanese by many Japanese people involved in fisheries. Japan’s fish food culture and 
Japan’s food security are seen as being at stake in debates over government support for 
distant water tuna fisheries, so neoliberal reforms may be framed as being against national 
economic and cultural welfare. Attempts to reduce or change the nature of government 
support for these fisheries may be framed as attacks on Japan, and therefore represented as 
illegitimate. The normative framework for governance of Japan’s distant water tuna 
fisheries therefore supports the status quo in fisheries governance. Norms alone do not 
determine governance, so a severe economic downturn in tuna fisheries or some other shift 
in the situation could render this normative tendency less effective. At the time of writing, 
however, the prevailing public policy ideology regarding tuna fisheries visible in 
representations by key stakeholders indicate that these stakeholders are unlikely to support 
neoliberal reforms, indeed they are more likely to oppose them. 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
The governance of Japan’s distant water tuna fisheries has been characterized by a high 
degree of co-management between industry and government, as have many sectors in 
Japan’s economy. The gaikaku dantai layer of public corporations acts as a conduit for 
policy collaboration and for the spending of government money to support industry. 
Koizumi and other reformers have made limited headway in changing economic 
governance, in terms of decreasing economic intervention and increasing the role of market 
mechanisms in shaping industries. Our research shows that neoliberal reforms were not 
evident in governance of distant water tuna fisheries under the MAFF by the early 2000s. 
 
Norms of tuna fisheries governance in key stakeholder groups, such as the bureaucracy, 
consumer groups and academia, dovetail with structural inertia of entrenched vested 
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interests against neoliberal reform. In tuna fisheries the politically powerful discourses of 
food security and cultural heritage are pitted against neoliberalism, strands of which are 
framed as excessive globalization by key stakeholders. Neoliberalism is not visible in 
public policy representations by stakeholders in tuna fisheries, indeed there are indications 
that a push towards neoliberalism in tuna fisheries would be framed as anti-Japanese and 
therefore be resisted. Even if other sectors of the Japanese economy become more 
neoliberal, the domestic normative context makes it likely arguments would be mounted to 
protect tuna fisheries as a special case, much as rice production has been protected. 
International fisheries managers engaging with Japan should do so bearing in mind that 
Japanese norms about what constitutes good economic governance are very different from 
those in the U.S.A., the U.K., Australia, New Zealand, Iceland, Canada, and other countries 
where neoliberalism is more or less accepted in fisheries policy making circles. 
 
Although we argue that neoliberal reform in Japan’s distant water tuna fisheries is unlikely 
in the foreseeable future, however, it remains a possibility. Japan’s ongoing economic 
difficulties undermine the status quo in both structures and norms. The failure of massive 
public spending to solve the recession in the 1990s may be used by neoliberals to gain 
support for their reform initiatives. Public dissatisfaction with the waste and corruption of 
the old corporatist system may also be harnessed to the neoliberal cause. The future of 
Japan’s distant water tuna longline industry is in doubt at present, and if the industry 
collapses or shrinks to a far less significant proportion of the market its lobbying power 
may be reduced. These factors combined give reformers such as Koizumi more leverage 
than if the industry was stable and the public satisfied with MAFF governance, so tuna 
fisheries may yet feel the effects of his pledge to bring neoliberalism to Japan. 
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